(de-news.net) – After the sabotage of power lines in Berlin, Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) has warned of a renewed and intensifying threat from left-wing terrorism in Germany. According to the Interior Ministry’s assessment, the attack was not an improvised act but a carefully prepared and technically proficient operation, pointing to the reemergence of organized left-terrorist activity. Particular alarm was raised by the content of the claim of responsibility, which the minister interpreted as clear evidence of ideologically driven violence intertwined with forms of climate extremism and explicitly directed against public safety, everyday social routines, and the foundations of economic stability.
In response to the extensive blackout triggered by the sabotage, Dobrindt called for the adoption of a comprehensive security package. He argued that the incident demonstrated, in concrete terms, the limits of existing instruments and underscored the need for a substantial expansion of investigative powers in the digital domain. This, he maintained, should include the retention of IP addresses as well as the broader application of source telecommunications surveillance, both of which were presented as essential tools for preventing, detecting, and prosecuting comparable attacks more effectively in the future.
These concerns were widely shared by representatives of industry. The Federation of German Industries reiterated its call for significantly stronger protection of critical infrastructure, stressing that security-relevant information must neither be freely accessible to the public nor allowed to fall into unauthorized hands. Against the backdrop of the current threat environment, its deputy executive director criticized the existing draft legislation on uniform standards for the protection of critical infrastructure as inadequate. While the proposed Critical Infrastructure Umbrella Act is intended to enhance Germany’s resilience through the introduction of minimum standards, systematic risk analyses, and structured disruption monitoring, it was argued that these measures alone would not sufficiently reflect the scale and complexity of the risks involved. Similar demands for reinforced safeguards were voiced by Berlin’s mayor. At the same time, energy providers reported that approximately 25,000 households remained without electricity following the attack on a cable bridge.
Going beyond these demands, the German Association for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses advocated the creation of a dedicated crisis response unit specifically designed to address attacks on critical infrastructure. According to the association, such a unit would need to be immediately operational in order to contain economic damage as rapidly as possible in the event of major disruptions. The Economic Council of the Christian Democratic Union estimated the macroeconomic damage caused by the blackout to be in the hundreds of millions of euros, pointing to closed businesses, disrupted supply chains, and widespread interruptions to schools and childcare facilities that prevented large numbers of employees from working.
From the council’s perspective, the incident starkly exposed the vulnerability of Germany’s economic and social systems. It therefore urged the federal government to systematically identify and close existing resilience gaps in the energy infrastructure, with particular urgency attached to the growing threat posed by drone overflights, which could facilitate reconnaissance and planning for future attacks. The council warned that the power grid is already the target of hybrid and cyber-based operations, making the danger an immediate reality rather than a hypothetical future risk. In light of this assessment, a strategic shift was deemed necessary, moving away from fragmented and dispersed responsibilities toward an integrated and operational protection framework. Such a shift would require sustained investment in prevention, redundancies, emergency preparedness, and training, as well as the closer integration of companies and critical infrastructure operators into national security strategies, recognizing them as partners in security policy rather than as mere objects of regulation.
